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Environmental tariffs appear to be a politically necessary part of the climate change 
policies that are emerging in many countries. The appeal of level playing field 
arguments is seductive and difficult to dispute. Environmental policy makers, however, 
may be naïve, because they fail to account for the potential of trade policy mechanisms 
and institutions to be captured by traditional vested interests seeking economic 
protection. The exact structures and institutional frameworks for environmental tariffs 
are often left vague by environmental policy makers, making them easy targets for 
protectionists. Environmental tariffs appear to be particularly vulnerable to capture 
given the complexity of production and the embryonic stage of the science of 
measuring carbon intensity. The article outlines the threats to the international trading 
system posed by environmental tariffs and suggests cooperation between those 
responsible for developing environmental policy and those responsible for developing 
trade policy.    
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In connection with international trade policy, one often hears expressed the 
importance of the “level playing field”. 
The meaning and implications of this goal are anything but clear. To a 
certain degree it may imply preserving a competitive market atmosphere 
for world trade …. 
But often something more is meant by the “level playing field” idea. Even 
“economically competitive” actions by foreign firms are considered in 
some cases to be “unfair”, and thus disturb the “level playing field”. 
Certain categories of actions have for many decades been considered to be 
“unfair”, by nations and the international rules of trade. Among these are 
“dumping” and “subsidy” activities …. It is not always clear whether all 
the practices subsumed by trade policy experts under these categories 
really have a damaging impact on a world trading system, or whether they 
provide for uneven conditions of competition for producing firms in other 
nations. Yet the goal of promoting a “level playing field” through national 
and international policies designed to inhibit dumping or subsidies, seems 
to have a powerful political appeal [emphasis added].  
John Jackson, 1992
1 
he latest incarnation of level playing field arguments is being played out in the 
policy making institutions of many countries. This time the culprit in the 
disturbance of the level playing field is the absence of an internationally agreed 
constraint on carbon emissions. The absence of an international agreement to deal 
with climate change, however, does not remove the domestic political imperative to 
attempt to put in place policies to address the causes of global warming. As a result, 
some countries are moving forward with domestic policy initiatives to, among other 
things, reduce carbon emissions. These initiatives will impose costs on firms. As the 
climate change initiatives of individual countries are uncoordinated both in their level 
of ambition and in structure, the inevitable question arises as to their effect on the 
relative international competitiveness of firms subject to differing regulatory regimes. 
Further, some countries may choose not to put climate change policies in place or not 
to enforce the regulations that they do put in place. While domestic firms may 
grudgingly acquiesce to the imposition of carbon taxes or “cap and trade” systems, 
they will object vociferously if they perceive climate change–inspired increases in 
costs will negatively affect their relative competiveness in the international market. 
Policy makers often cannot easily ignore such objections. If policies to lower carbon 
emissions make the playing field uneven, then policies to return to it to a level surface 
will be advocated. Environmental tariffs – border taxes – are being widely considered. 
Taxes would be applied to imports from countries that have less strict carbon 
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reduction policies or that do not adequately enforce those policies. Border taxes are 
easy to understand and have considerable political appeal. 
In many countries, environmentalists, civil society more broadly and policy 
makers have accepted the argument that the externalities associated with under pricing 
carbon are having, and are going to have, wide ranging effects on climate that have 
the potential to impose significant adjustment costs on the global economy. Dealing 
with that externality is a laudable policy goal. While the intellectual arguments 
pertaining to the links between environmental externalities and international trade are 
far from conclusive and the efficacy of environmental tariffs in achieving the goal of 
providing incentives to reduce carbon emissions even more tenuous, level playing 
field arguments are likely to prevail in climate change policy making – environmental 
tariffs in some form are likely inevitable. If that is true then how they are structured 
and implemented is extremely important. Environmental policy makers and trade 
policy makers have often been at odds in the past. This is because they do not 
understand each other very well. Environmental policy makers often have laudable 
goals and want to use trade policy measures as part of their tool kit (Kerr, 2001). 
Achieving their goal is paramount and their trade policy initiatives are focused on 
achieving their particular goal. On the other hand, the primary goal of those who are 
interested in the general-good aspects of trade policy is to protect the liberalizing 
aspects of the institutional structure of the international trading system. In particular, 
they are concerned that the institutions and mechanisms put in place for the purposes 
of environmental policy not be open for capture by economic protectionists. They do 
not want environmental trade policies to be harnessed to protectionist vested interests 
– providing protection against legitimately more efficient foreign competitors. Trade 
policy professionals have lots of examples of policies that have been captured by 
traditional protectionist interests – antidumping (Kerr and Loppacher, 2004) and 
unfair subsidies (countervailing duties) (Cullen and Kerr, 1989) come immediately to 
mind. Further, the Biosafety Protocol provides a direct example of an instance in 
which environmental trade policy making was captured (Hobbs, Hobbs and Kerr, 
2005; Holtby, Kerr and Hobbs, 2007). Thus, environmental policy makers often 
misinterpret the objections of trade policy experts as not being in sympathy with their 
goals – putting the benefits of trade ahead of benefits to the environment. Trade policy 
experts, instead, want policies structured so that the risk of capture – and thus damage 
to the trading system – will be minimized. 
To trade policy professionals, environmental policy makers who wish to put in 
place trade policies often appear naïve, failing to understand the tenacity and 
resourcefulness of protectionist vested interests. These professionals don’t deny the William A. Kerr 
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desirability of dealing with many environmental issues but are often uncomfortable 
with the form of trade policy initiatives put in place under the guise of environmental 
policy – as they are with respect to initiatives designed to deal with other policy goals 
related to, for example, labour standards (Bakhshi and Kerr, 2008), animal welfare 
(Hobbs et al., 2002), bioterrorism (Kerr, 2004), etc., that can encompass trade policy 
as part of their policy mix. This failure to communicate among policy makers can lead 
to acrimony, which can escape the confines of policy debates and spill over into 
broad-based concerns of civil society – the conflicts over U.S. tuna-dolphin and 
shrimp-turtle initiatives are examples. 
One of the ways in which the potential for conflict plays out is in legislation 
which enshrines the use of trade policy measures as part of the means to achieve 
environmental policy goals but leaves the specifics of the trade policy mechanisms to 
be worked out later. It is the details that matter to those who evaluate trade policy, and 
they find it hard to support vague legislative initiatives. Protectionists have been adept 
at having trade regulations and implementation work to their advantage even if this 
was not the intent of the legislation. The environmental tariffs envisioned as part of 
the climate change policy mix appear likely to be the next example of this lack of 
transparency and precision (James, 2009). 
The intellectual discussion over the appropriateness of trade policy measures as 
part of the package of climate change policy initiatives is being conducted at a number 
of levels. The broad issues surrounding the link between international trade and 
environment have been extensively explored by a number of authors (Copeland and 
Taylor, 2003; Belcher, Hobbs and Kerr, 2003), as well as, more explicitly, issues 
relating to climate change and trade (Gaisford, Kerr and Pancoast, 2004; Gaisford, 
2010). The results related to the broader question of whether or not trade should be a 
concern of environmental (or climate change) policy are theoretically inconclusive, 
with the empirical evidence leaning toward trade being a positive influence on 
environmental enhancement. There appears to be little empirical support for the 
“pollution haven” hypothesis, whereby firms choose to locate where environmental 
regulations are lax, or the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, whereby governments 
lower (or fail to raise) environmental standards as a way to enhance competitiveness. 
According to Copeland and Taylor (2003, 185-186), 
… before we condemn trade because it creates harmful pollution havens, 
we must remember that differences in pollution policy are only one of 
many factors that cause trade. … [W]e identified two key assumptions 
behind most pollution haven models: inequality in the world distribution 
of income, and relative production costs determined by pollution 
regulations alone. We cited evidence showing large inequalities in world William A. Kerr 
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distribution of income, but offered no evidence that pollution regulations 
were an important determinant of costs. If other factors dominate the 
effects of pollution policy on comparative advantage, then trade may not 
concentrate polluting industries in countries with weak environmental 
regulation. 
Despite the absence of strong evidence to support the linking of environmental 
policy to trade policy, arguments relating to a loss of the level playing field and 
pollution havens – carbon leakage in the case of greenhouse gases
2 – appear to be 
those garnering the attention of environmental policy makers. They fret about jobs lost 
to foreign competitors through direct competition and future job losses as firms 
choose to locate in pollution havens (Sheldon, 2010). According to James (2009) the 
evidence of the threat to competitiveness and substantial carbon leakage is weak. She 
goes on to say, 
… compelling logic has not prevented politicians from talking about using 
trade measures as a weapon. Carbon tariffs and other trade measures can, 
by their reasoning, be used as “leverage” to encourage errant countries to 
adopt climate change reducing measures: by dangling the carrot of 
increased access to markets if the trade partner adopts the “correct” policy, 
countries will want to reduce their emissions for the supposed benefit of 
all (James, 2009, 4). 
Thus, it appears as if politicians, at least in the United States, have bought into the 
efficacy of trade sanctions
3 despite evidence that they are unlikely to be effective. 
The other place where environmental tariffs are being debated relates to whether 
they are compatible with the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Sheldon, 2010; 
James, 2009). One thread of the argument suggests that environmental tariffs are 
simply a subset of border tax adjustments,4 which are allowed under the WTO 
(Sheldon, 2010). There are a range of arguments against the idea that environmental 
tariffs are equivalent to border tax adjustments (James, 2009) and the question will 
likely require a WTO panel ruling to sort it out. If they are ruled WTO-legal under the 
rubric of being a form of border tax adjustment, then environmental tariffs will be 
accepted relatively easily. If they are not considered a subset of border tax 
adjustments, then other avenues to gain acceptance for environmental tariffs would 
have to be pursued. Governments could try to gain them a general exemption to WTO 
disciplines through GATT Article XX (g), which allows measures that relate to the 
conservation of natural resources. Again, there are arguments on each side of this 
question (James, 2009), and WTO panels will have to adjudicate. If Article XX (g) 
exemptions are required, however, each country would have to submit its particular 
form of environmental tariffs and co-requisite policies to a panel – for example, to 
gain an exemption it must be demonstrated that the tax is part of a program to William A. Kerr 
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conserve natural resources and that it is the least trade distorting means to achieve the 
goal. 
The environmental tax must be structured in such a way as to not discriminate 
against sources of imports, so targeting individual countries would be unlikely to 
withstand a WTO challenge. Further, carbon intensity is a production attribute, and the 
WTO rules do not allow discrimination against like products based on how they are 
produced, that is, on their production and processing methods (PPMs). This would 
mean the tax could not be structured to apply to imports with a high carbon footprint 
but be waived for products with a low carbon footprint. This constraint would seem to 
negate the intent of, for example, current U.S. legislation which would seek to reward 
those countries with strong environmental policies with market access and punish 
countries with lax environmental policies by denying or restricting market access. In 
short, environmental tariffs may well be subject to a wide range of challenges at the 
WTO. In the end, however, given the current political will to execute climate change 
policy in a manner that maintains, or creates, a level playing field, environmental 
tariffs are likely to become a fact of life – either through changes pushed through the 
WTO or through countries choosing to ignore WTO rulings. After all, the WTO’s 
enforcement powers are, in reality, weak – countries are allowed to retaliate through 
denial of market access. There are few countries whose retaliation would have a 
sufficiently significant impact on the United States or the EU to have them alter their 
climate change policy. While acceptance of retaliation is a country’s right under the 
WTO, it is seldom used. It has been accepted, by the EU for example, when there was 
strong consumer resistance to opening the market to beef produced using growth 
hormones and retaliation continued for a decade (Kerr and Hobbs, 2005); however, 
widespread ignoring of WTO commitments would likely lead to chaotic beggar-thy-
neighbour retaliation and serious damage to the credibility and efficacy of the WTO. 
Of course, a weakening of international trade institutions would play directly into 
protectionist hands. One suspects that, over the intermediate run, the member states of 
the WTO will find a way to accommodate environmental tariffs. As Gaisford (2010, 
236) suggests, 
It would be difficult to escape the conclusion that there were few if any 
consequences for countries that engaged in political posturing rather than 
action in relation to their Kyoto commitments or chose to ignore or back 
out of their commitments entirely. This poses significant credibility issues 
for the Copenhagen Accord and any future agreements. In the wake of the 
credibility issue exposed by the Kyoto Protocol, there is a growing sense 
that there need to be trade-consequences for countries that do not make or 
follow through with commitments. To forestall a likely drift toward a free-
for-all of retaliation for non-compliance and counter-retaliation, there is a William A. Kerr 
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strong case to be made for World Trade Organization (WTO) oversight of 
trade penalties. 
If environmental tariffs are likely to become part of the international trade 
architecture, then they must be structured carefully and administrative institutions put 
in place to ensure that they are not open to capture by traditional protectionist 
interests. Protectionists crave a cloak of legitimacy (Kerr and Perdikis, 2003), and 
environmental tariffs could provide that cloak. 
The first question to examine is when would it be appropriate to apply an 
environmental tariff to imports. For example, current proposed U.S. legislation – the 
Waxman-Markey bill – envisions blanket tariffs on imports from countries that have 
lesser environmental standards than the United States. Such blanket tariffs, however, 
are likely to create perverse incentives that inhibit investments in carbon emission 
technologies in exporting countries. As James (2009, 12) points out, 
It should also be noted that assessing the carbon footprint of a product 
based on national averages will potentially work against the ostensible 
purpose of climate-change regulations. To the extent that efforts to 
produce goods more cleanly impose costs on a firm, if those efforts are not 
recognized by a trade partner that discriminates on a country-level basis 
rather than a firm-level basis, unilateral trade restrictions could in fact 
discourage the adoption of cleaner technologies. Why produce at higher 
cost if you cannot gain improved market access as a result? 
If environmental tariffs are to be applied on a country-wide basis, then the 
mechanism that determines to which country they are to apply becomes important – 
but thus far there is little indication as to the institutional structure that is envisioned in 
the major countries considering environmental tariffs. One model would be for 
importing countries to establish, or designate, a domestic institution to independently 
monitor the environmental policies of 150-plus countries and recommend when tariffs 
should be applied – to monitor a smaller set than WTO membership would clearly be 
discriminatory. Of course, it would also likely be desirable to monitor some countries 
such as Russia, Iran and Belarus that are not WTO members. It is, however, difficult 
to imagine such a mechanisms being totally independent from importing industries – 
either through indirect lobbying of politicians or directly through institutionalized 
complaint mechanisms. This opens the door to not only those industries truly 
disadvantaged by imports from countries where environmental laws are lax but also 
from firms that find it difficult to compete for other reasons – those seeking economic 
protection. The institution would then be faced with determining when complaints of 
injury from imports legitimately arise due to environmental cost disadvantages. This 
will be very difficult. William A. Kerr 
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Presumably, if environmental tariffs are to be applied on a country-by-country 
basis, then those countries to which tariffs are to be applied will be able to see the 
evidence against them and to raise objections. Mechanisms for adjudication will be 
necessary – either domestic or international. Further, countries to which 
environmental tariffs are applied may choose to alter their environmental policies to 
come into compliance. Environmental tariffs will have to be a form of contingent 
protection. Thus, there must be a review and evaluation process to remove the 
environmental tariffs if the situation in exporting countries changes. Protectionists 
have proved adept at manipulating such mechanisms to delay the removal trade 
restrictions.
5 The risk of country-country disputes over this and other issues is likely 
to lead to acrimonious international relations. 
The alternative to country-wide environmental tariffs – an alternative that is likely 
to have considerable appeal given the damage to international relations that country-
wide application may engender – is firm-level application of the tariffs. Individual 
firms determined to have been in receipt of a benefit that alters the playing field could 
have environmental tariffs applied to their imports. Instead of a major monitoring 
effort, complaints from disadvantaged industries would be the basis for launching an 
investigation that could lead to the imposition of environmental tariffs. Of course, this 
is the familiar contingent protection model used for the application of antidumping 
duties and countervailing duties. It would remove environmental tariffs from being a 
country-level dispute and would focus instead on the individual firm’s cost. Of course, 
use of the environmental dumping approach would be fraught with the same 
difficulties as unfair pricing and unfair subsidy determinations and their co-requisite 
injury determinations. Dumping and countervailing duties mechanisms are widely 
recognized protectionist mechanisms that have little legitimacy (Kerr, 2001). The need 
to provide information and to mount a defence means that the mechanism itself 
imposes considerable, sometimes crippling, costs on accused firms, so that import-
competing firms are not as interested in winning the case as they are in garnering the 
protection the process itself provides (Barichello, 2007). Unless carefully structured, 
environmental tariff mechanisms could easily be equally valuable to protectionists. 
The methods that have been devised to calculate antidumping and countervailing 
duties are biased toward providing protection (Kerr and Loppacher, 2004).
6 To 
determine the size of the environmental tariffs to apply, the carbon intensity of 
products and/or the production processes used to produce them must be calculated. 
Given that there is no internationally accepted methodology for making these 
calculations (James, 2009; Gaisford, 2010), ad hoc methods are likely to be put in 
place. Without a sound theoretical basis for the calculations, there is potential for William A. Kerr 
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protectionist bias to creep in. Further, given the complexity of modern international 
supply chains it may be very difficult to determine the proportion of the carbon 
footprint that arises from the environmental laws in each country. The complex nature 
of this set of factors will challenge, and severely, the calculating abilities of the 
institutions charged with determining the size of the environmental tariffs to apply. 
Thus far, the intent appears to be to apply environmental tariffs on a relative basis 
– according to the differences in the costs imposed by (stringent) domestic 
environmental regulations versus (lax) foreign environmental regulations. Current 
countervailing duty calculations, for example, only examine the absolute level of 
subsidy received by an exporter – in other words the subsidies received by import-
competing domestic producers are ignored. Protectionist bias can easily creep into 
calculations through a proclivity to overestimate the domestic costs of environmental 
regulations and underestimate the cost imposed by foreign regulations. 
Of course, these adversarial mechanisms for proving dumping, unfair subsidies 
and injury are costly to use – legal teams must be hired to present and argue cases. If 
protectionists have deeper pockets, then they will disproportionally reap the potential 
benefits from protection. Trade lawyers must be gleefully anticipating the 
implementation of environmental tariffs. There is much to be learned from the poorly 
designed and executed antidumping and countervail mechanisms, but it is not clear 
that the framers of environmental policy understand these deficiencies or would be 
willing to invest in devising superior alternatives. 
Given the problems with environmental tariffs, which are a second-best or third-
best policy option, at best there is some hope that further attempts at attaining a “first-
best” solution will be inspired (James, 2009). It is well known that directly dealing 
with the source of the environmental externality is the “first-best” policy option. A 
strong multilateral replacement for the Kyoto Protocol could be a “first-best” option, 
but the failure to accomplish this in Copenhagen in late 2009 illustrates the difficulties 
associated with this approach. Even if such an agreement can be achieved, it may well 
be that it would have to incorporate environmental tariffs. As Gaisford (2010, 237) 
concludes, 
Nevertheless, it appears to be a given that if countries agree to significant 
GHG reductions under the ... Accord, then trade penalties will be imposed 
on those that do not follow through by those that do. The only real 
question appears to be whether or not there will be international disciplines 
on such trade penalties. 
Thus, it seems that environmental tariffs are likely to become part of the 
environmental policy architecture, either multilaterally or unilaterally, and part of the 
international trade architecture in the near future. Environmental policy makers will, William A. Kerr 
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in their minds, have gained a victory. It is imperative that they do not rest on their 
laurels – embedding environmental tariffs in the environmental and trade policy 
institutional architecture is only half the battle. They need to work with trade policy 
professionals to ensure that the mechanisms and institutions that are used to 
implement environmental tariffs are not open to capture by those seeking traditional 
economic protection. A first step would be to accept that there are those that have 
strong incentives to capture trade policies and use them for their nefarious purposes. 
 
 
 William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   346 
 
References  
Bakhshi, S., and W. A. Kerr (2008) Incorporating Labour Standards in Trade 
Agreements: Protectionist Ploy or Legitimate Trade Policy Issue? International 
Journal of Trade and Global Markets 1(4): 373-391. 
Barichello, R.R. (2007) Administrative Procedures, the Distribution of Costs and 
Benefits, and Incentives in Anti-dumping Cases. In W.A. Kerr and J.D. Gaisford 
(eds.) Handbook on International Trade Policy, 360-367. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Belcher, K., A.L. Hobbs, and W.A. Kerr (2003) The WTO and Environmental 
Sustainability: Is There a Conflict? International Journal of Environment and 
Sustainable Development 2(1): 2-18. 
Copeland, B.R. (2003) Trade and the Environment. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Cullen, S.E., and W.A. Kerr (1989) International Competitiveness and Resource Rents 
– Insights from the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Dispute. World Competition 
Law and Economics Review 12(3): 25-39. 
Gaisford, J.D. (2010) From Kyoto to Copenhagen: Meeting the Climate Change 
Challenge. The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 
11(1): 227-241. 
Gaisford, J.D., W.A. Kerr, and R. Pancoast (2004) Rethinking Kyoto. Energy Politics 
1: 8-14. 
Hobbs, A.L., J.E. Hobbs, and W.A. Kerr (2005) The Biosafety Protocol: Multilateral 
Agreement on Protecting the Environment or Protectionist Club? Journal of 
World Trade 39(2): 281-300. 
Hobbs, A.L., J.E. Hobbs, G.E. Isaac, and W.A. Kerr (2002) Ethics, Domestic Food 
Policy and Trade Law: Assessing the EU Animal Welfare Proposal to the WTO. 
Food Policy 27: 437-454. 
Holtby, K.L., W.A. Kerr, and J.E. Hobbs (2007) International Environmental Liability 
and Barriers to Trade. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Jackson, J. (1992) The World Trading System. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
James, S. (2009) A Harsh Climate for Trade: How Climate Change Proposals 
Threaten Global Commerce. Trade Policy Analysis No. 41, Center for Trade 
Policy Studies. Washington: The Cato Institute. 
Kerr, W.A. (2006) Dumping: Trade Policy in Need of a Theoretical Make Over. 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 54(1): 11-31. 
Kerr, W.A. (2004) Homeland Security and the Rules of International Trade. Estey 
Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 5(1): 1-10. 
Kerr, W.A. (2001) The World Trade Organization and the Environment. In H.J. 
Michelman, J. Rude, J. Stabler, and G. Storey (eds.) Globalization and 
Agricultural Trade Policy, 53-65. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   347 
 
Kerr, W.A., and J.D. Gaisford (1994) A Note on Increasing the Effectiveness of 
Sanctions. Journal of World Trade 28(6): 169-176. 
Kerr, W.A., and J.E. Hobbs (2005) Consumers, Cows and Carousels: Why the Dispute 
Over Beef Hormones is Far More Important than Its Commercial Value. In N. 
Perdikis and R. Read (eds.) The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade, 
191-214. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Kerr, W.A., and L.J. Loppacher (2004) Antidumping in the Doha Negotiations: Fairy 
Tales at the World Trade Organization. Journal of World Trade 38(2): 211-244. 
Kerr, W.A., and N. Perdikis (2003) The Economics of International Business: A Guide 
to the Global Commercial Environment. Estey Centre Program in International 
Trade Education. Saskatoon: Estey Centre for Law and Economics in 
International Trade. 
Loppacher, L.J., and W.A. Kerr (2005) The Efficacy of World Trade Organization 
Rules on Sanitary Barriers: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in North 
America. Journal of World Trade, 39(3): 427-443. 
Sheldon, I. (2010) Climate Policy and Border Tax Adjustments: Some New Wine 
Mixed with Old Wine in New Green Bottles? The Estey Centre Journal of 









 William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   348 
 
Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  See Jackson (1992, 17). 
2.  Carbon leakage relates to concerns that the expected reduction in carbon emissions 
will be reduced due to firms moving to pollution havens so that they will not have 
to reduce (or reduce as much) their carbon emissions.  
3.  See Kerr and Gaisford (1994) for a general discussion of the efficacy of trade 
sanctions. 
4.  Border tax adjustments – both import taxes and export subsidies – are allowed to 
offset the effects of a consumption or indirect tax such as a value added tax. 
5.  One recent example is the case of U.S. restrictions on imports of meat and animal 
products in the wake of the discovery of BSE – mad cow disease – in Canada. See 
Loppacher and Kerr (2005). 
6.  For example, methods that allow Japanese labour rates to be proxies for labour 
rates in India or Vietnam and U.S. electric power rates to be proxies for those in 
China; the selective use of data in zeroing; etc. 